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ABSTRACT
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We study retailers’ preferences for transshipment timing in the presence of product
substitution in overlapping markets where there is either pre-substitution
transshipment (TS) or post-substitution transshipment (ST). By building a two-retailer
game model, we find that when the retailer with excess inventory can dictate the
transshipment price, there always exists a unique pair of equilibrium order quantities.
We also find that the equilibrium order quantity in the post-substitution transshipment
will always be larger than that in the pre-substitution transshipment in the symmetric
case. But surprisingly, the expected profit of the post-substitution transshipment
always dominates that of the pre-substitution transshipment, though the presubstitution transshipment has mitigated the inventory competition. We then examine
the impact of the transshipment price, the switching probability, and transshipment
cost to the retailers’ profit. Through extensive numerical experiments, we find that
when a large proportion of customers are willing to switch and the transshipment price
is low, retailers prefer pre-substitution transshipment; but when there are almost no
switching customers or the transshipment price is high, retailers prefer postsubstitution transshipment. We further study an asymmetric game and find that
asymmetry benefits the retailer with cost advantage but damages the other retailer. We
also find that two asymmetric retailers may prefer different transshipment timings in
the asymmetric case.
Key words: Transshipment, Substitution, Timing
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1

Introduction

In reality, it often happens that customers experience stockout when they step into a
store. To deal with mismatch between demand and supply, customers and retailers
have their own ways. In overlapping market, a customer may switch to another nearby
store to buy his target product. However, in non-overlapping market where it is costly
for customers to switch, retailers may share their inventory by transshipping leftover
inventory from one retailer to another in shortage. These two mechanisms helping
ease supply and demand mismatch are called product substitution and transshipment
respectively. In supply chain management, study of substitution or transshipment is
one of the main research branches. A lot of interesting problems have been discussed
in the past 30 years. In recent years, researchers find that transshipment is also implemented in the overlapping market by retailers and thus begin to study the interaction
of these two mechanisms.
Three representative papers have studied transshipment in the presence of substitution. Firstly, Çömez et al. (2012) build a two-retailer game to study the optimal
transshipment policy. They assume that one unit of the requested transshipment
quantity is made when there is stockout and customer switching may happen after
the transshipment request is rejected. Fu et al. (2020) build a two-stage newsvendor
model to study the mutual effect of those two mechanisms. They also assume retailers
transship their leftover inventory before unsatisfied customers switching to other retailers. Guo and Wu (2018) study transshipment and product substitution with capacity
constraints. They assume transshipment happens after disloyal customers switching to
the other retailers. These two different transshipment timings motivate our research.
How does transship timing (before or after customer switching) influence the retailer’s
optimal decisions and profits? Here we call the transshipment before substitution the
pre-substitution transshipment and we call the transshipment after substitution the
post-substitution transshipment.
In overlapping market, pre-substitution transshipment has its own merits. Retailers
conducting lateral transshipment when needed could avoid the loss of customers to
the utmost. However, post-substitution transshipment also benefits them because the
transshipment cost which should be borne by retailers will be transferred to customers.
So that retailers could still retain a certain number of customers without any additional
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cost. In addition, the inventory competition between the two retailers makes the
problems even fuzzier. It is not intuitive whether pre-substitution transshipment is
superior or inferior to post-substitution transshipment.
We aim to provide managerial insights to managers about when to implement
transshipment in the presence of customer switching. There are several important
questions worth being cleaned up. Firstly, how does transshipment timing affect the
inventory competition? Does transshipment mitigate or intensify the inventory competition and how does the answer depend on transshipment timing? Secondly, how does
substitution interact with transshipment in different transshipment timing? How does
the transshipment timing affect the profits of retailers? Lastly, how do the problem
parameters affect the above answers?
Our main results and contributions are as follows: First, we find that when retailer with excess inventory is powerful enough to decide the transshipment price, in
which case it will set transshipment price as high as possible to the transshipment
buyers’ retail price (see Shao et al. 2011 and Fu et al. 2020), the equilibrium order
quantity for both transshipment timings always exists and it is also unique. Second,
we find that the order quantity of the post-substitution transshipment is always higher
than that of the pre-substitution transshipment in the symmetric case. This closedform result enriches the results of the previous transshipment research. In previous
research, the order quantity can be higher or lower under transshipment than under
non-transshipment depending on the problem parameters (see Rudi et al. 2001, Hu
et al. 2007, and Fu et al. 2020). This result contributes to the better performance of
the post-substitution transshipment for supplier and customers because larger order
quantity brings higher profit to the supplier and higher fulfilling rate to the customers.
Last but most importantly, we find that the expected profit under the post-substitution
transshipment is always higher than that under the pre-substitution transshipment for
symmetric retailers. It is worth mentioning that due to the high complexity, only a
limited number of literature has compared the profits of different transshipment related competition models, such as Zhao and Atkins (2009). Our results will flourish
the previous research and hopefully provide some insights into how to tackle problems
related to the expected profits for newsvendor models.
Our numerical experiments examine the interaction of transshipment and substitution by studying the influence of several important parameters. First, we find that
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when more customers are willing to switch and the transshipment price is low, presubstitution transshipment benefits retailers more. But when there are almost no
switching customers or when the transshipment price is high, post-substitution transshipment will be preferable for retailers. We further study an asymmetric game (one
retailer has cost advantage and the other has cost disadvantage). We first compare the
equilibrium order quantity relationship between asymmetric retailers which rarely appears in the literature. We find that asymmetry will lead the retailer with advantage to
stock more inventory than the other retailer in Stage 1. But though we still let transshipment price be set to the transshipment buyer’s retail price, now two asymmetric
retailers may not prefer the same scenario at the same time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related
literature. We introduce the post-substitution transshipment model in Section 3. In
Section 4, we analyze the transshipment decisions and discuss the existence of a unique
Nash Equilibrium for the post-substitution transshipment. Some sensitivity analysis
results are presented. In Section 5, we compare several important factors resulting from
the two timing scenarios and their interactions. We then compare the performance
of the two timing scenarios. We do some numerical and asymmetric extensions in
Section 6 and conclude our article in Section 7. Some of the proofs are delegated to
the appendix.
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2

Literature Review

Inspired by the big fluctuation of newspaper selling quantity, newsvendor model provides an optimal order quantity to newsboy who faced with uncertain newspaper demand every day. This theory has been extended widely by researchers in the past
several decades. Among various extensions and applications of the newsvendor model,
two streams of research are highly remarkable: product substitution and transshipment. First, Parlar (1988) captured a special phenomenon that customers with unmet
demand from one retailer will switch to another retailer for purchasing (product substitution). He used a game-theoretic method combined with the classic newsvendor model
to model this phenomenon and his paper was followed by a large group of researchers.
Until 2001, Rudi et al. (2001) noticed another phenomenon that is widespread in the
retailing industry—transshipment. He changed the previous research setting by rebuilding the competing relationship between two retailers who transship their leftover
inventory with each other. From then on, hundreds of papers focusing on transshipment have been published. In recent years, more and more people begin to focus on
the coexistence of these two mechanisms and their mutual impact on the interests of
different stakeholders.
Here firstly, we will introduce those papers which only study the substitution mechanism based on Parlar (1988) who studies a one-period two-retailer game. After Parlar
(1988), Wang and Palar (1994) extend the two-retailer model to a three-person game.
This multi-retailer game adds more research directions to this topic that they further
analyze the cooperation of different parties and conditions to facilitate cooperation.
It was a rather early try to study the cooperation policy design. In 2003, Netessine
and Rudi (2003) extend this substitution game to an n-player game. Different from
the above two papers, they mainly focus on the comparison of the centralized and decentralized systems. They contribute to the literature by finding an analytical policy
that facilitates the comparison. Another highly related paper is from Lippman and
McCardle (1997). But they mainly focus on the analysis of the splitting mechanism
for demand allocation and reallocation. They discuss the relationship between the
splitting rules and the existence of a unique Nash Equilibrium.
Another main branch studying substitution is the multi-period setting, for example,
Avsar and Baykal-Gürsoy (2002) study the model of Parlar (1988) in infinite periods
4

and prove the uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium. Netessione and Rudi (2006) consider a two-retailer and multi-period model with substitution. They assume back order
is a choice for retailers. They show that a stationary base stock policy is a Nash Equilibrium under specific conditions. Nagarajan and Rajagopalan (2009) first study a
single period model and then extend it to a multi-periodic review scenario. They use
the splitting rule raised by Lippman and McCardle (1997). They identify several conditions under which firms can neglect the substitution demand and their competitors’
inventory decisions when making their own decisions. Caro et al. (2010) study the
impact of quick response under asymmetric competition which is a two-period version
of Lippman and McCardle (1997) and they provide conditions for the existence of the
unique pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium for this asymmetric competition.
Secondly, in 2001, Rudi et al. (2001) and Anupindi et al. (2001) create a new research stage for this kind of models. They replace the substitution by transshipment
in those models, and thus bring some new questions to this old model. Rudi et al.
(2001) study a two-retailer transshipment game in which they mainly discuss the existence of the Nash equilibrium and the coordinating transshipment price. Different
from the competitive model in Rudi et al. (2001), Anupindi et al. (2001) assume retailers make competitive inventory decisions in the first stage and they make cooperative
transshipment decisions in the second stage. This structure helps them to analyze the
n-player game model. They manage to find an allocation method that contributes to
the achievement of the first-best solution. Much following work has been done after
the above two papers. Following Rudi et al. (2001), Hu et al. (2007) show that the coordinating transshipment price may not always exist. They identify the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique pair of coordinating transshipment
prices. Hezarkhani and Kubiak (2010) use the generalized bargaining approach to study competition among retailers, and they derive a coordinating transshipment price
that can always lead to a coordinating contract. Dong and Rudi (2004) and Zhang
(2005) study how transshipment with exogenous or endogenous wholesale prices affect
manufacturers and retailers. Shao et al. (2011) study the preference of transshipment
price for manufactures and retailers in endogenous wholesale prices. They find that
the manufacture always prefers higher transshipment price while decentralized retailers prefer lower transshipment price. Following Anupindi et al. (2001), Granot and
Sošić (2003) add a non-cooperative stage before the shipping decision and they show
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that the dual price allocation rule will not induce retailers to fully share their residual
inventories and demands. Sošić (2006) show that if the profit is split by the Shapley
value rather than by the dual price, complete inventory sharing will come true. Huang
and Sošić (2010a) consider a multi-period version of Granot and Sošić (2003), they
show that if the discount factor is sufficiently large, full sharing is a subgame perfect
equilibrium when the number of period approaches infinity.
Another important branch of studies compares the performances of substitution
and transshipment, such as Zhao and Atkins (2009) and Jiang and Anupindi (2010).
Zhao and Atkins (2009) study a transshipment game and a substitution game between
competing retailers separately. Their study provides advice for retailers about which
mechanisms should they take under different market parameters. Jiang and Anupindi
(2010) do a similar job but they include more broad discussions, such as the endogenous
discussion of many key parameters.
In recent years, people begin to study transshipment in the presence of product
substitution and study their mutual impact on the competition. There mainly are
three papers study this hybrid model. In terms of pre-substitution transshipment,
Çömez et al. (2012) study in-season transshipment under one-for-one ordering policies
and they assume demand arrives in Poisson process. Their focus is mainly on how a
retailer should choose with on-hand inventory, accept or reject the request considering
the possible substitution afterward. Fu et al. (2020) build a two-retailer newsvendor
model to study the end-of-season transshipment with potential substitution existing
after transshipment. They mainly discuss the impact of the transshipment price on the
retailers’ incentive to implement transshipment and compare the performance of the
pre-substitution transshipment with that of the non-transshipment case. For the postsubstitution transshipment, Guo and Wu (2018) study capacity sharing (inventory
pooling) between two firms who compete in price in an over capacity market. They
assume demands are deterministic. They mainly study the effects of the ex-ante and
ex-post transshipment prices on the performances of two firms with capacity constraint
or without capacity constraint.
Our research develops the previous studies and will enrich the insights of articles
in the following aspects. Firstly, to our best knowledge, no research has study the
newsvendor setting of the post-substitution transshipment and no research has focused on the impact of different transshipment timings on retailers’ inventory strategy.
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Secondly, most of the previous research mainly focuses on the existence and the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, in our model, we mainly focus on the profit performance
which is rarely discussed in the literature because of its high complexity. However, we
build a model that is well structured for easy operation and we hope it can inspire
future studies to explore deeply into the profit comparison of the newsvendor models.
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3

Model

In this section, we build a newsvedor model for post-substitution transshipment and
study the inventory competition between two retailers. We use superscript “ST ” to
denote post-substitution transshipment (e.g., transshipment is after customer switching).
Consider there are two retailers (denoted by i and j) selling identical products in
their respective but overlapping markets at price (ri , rj ). The retailers face random demand Di and Dj which follow a continuous distribution with joint distribution density
function denoted by f (xi , xj ). In Stage 1 before demand realization, retailers needs to
decide their order quantity (Qi , Qj ) in wholesale price (wi , wj ).
Demand is realized in Stage 2. If one of the retailer j (i) has unmet demand and
the other retailer i (j) has leftover inventory, the unmet customer will switch to retailer
i (j) to buy product with probability φj (φi ). After the disloyal customers switching,
retailers use transshipment to satisfy the demand of the existing loyal customers in
retailer j (i) at the predetermined transshipment price cij (cji ). Here we assume the
transshipment price is set by the inventory seller i (j) to the retail price rj (ri ) of the
transshipment buyer j (i) in Stage 2. This may happen when the loss of customers
could bring huge damage to the stockout retailers or when the retailer with leftover
inventory has very strong bargaining power. We relax this assumption in Section 6.1
to gain more insights into the impact of the transshipment price.
In addition, the incurred transshipment cost (τij , τji ) will be borne by the inventory
seller in Stage 2. At the end of Stage 2, the final leftover inventory in each retailer
will be salvaged at price (si , sj ). To ensure that transshipment only happens when one
retailer has leftover inventory and the other has a shortage. We further assume rj ≤
ri + τij to ensure that retailer i will use its on-hand inventory to meet its local demand
first; rj − τij ≥ si to ensure that retailer i will not hold a unit from transshipment to
salvage itself; and sj ≤ si +τij to ensure that retailer i will not gain from transshipping
a unit to retailer j for salvaging.
In Stage 2, suppose retailer i has leftover inventory Qi −Di and retailer j has unmet
demand Dj − Qj , a proportion φj of the unmet customers will switch to retailer i and
the demand is satisfied to the extent possible by the available inventory at retailer i.
The transshipment quantity Tij (the quantity delivered from retailer i to retailer j)
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will be determined by the actual demand realization situation after customer switching,
which is min[(1 − φj )(Dj − Qj )+ , (Qi − Di − φj (Dj − Qj ))+ ], the smaller of the demand
from the rest of customers at retailer j and the available leftover inventory at retailer
i. This sequence of events is similar to that of Guo and Wu (2018), where they assume
that loyal customers will stick by one brand and other customers will switch between
two brands when facing shortage. This may happen if waiting is costly for the disloyal
customers, so they will switch immediately to a nearby store for purchase. In contrast,
loyal customers will wait for possible replenishment in the future.
Let Ri denote the sales quantity at retailer i in price ri in the whole selling season:
RiST = min(Qi , Di ) + min[(Qi − Di )+ , φj (Dj − Qj )+ ] + Tji ,
where on the right-hand side are the sales quantities to the primary demand in Stage
1, the substitution demand Uji (i.e., unmet customers of retailer j that switche to
retailer i), and the demand satisfied by the transshipped-in quantity Tji in Stage 2.
The transshipping-out quantity is not included in RiST .
Similarly, the leftover inventory at retailer i is given by
LST
= [Qi − Di − (Dj − Qj )+ ]+ ,
i
which is the leftover inventory (if any) of the first stage minus the additional demand
from the other retailer in the second stage.
We have defined a two-stage game model where the retailers make competitive
order quantity decisions in Stage 1 (pre-season) based on the competition and the
demand realization situation in Stage 2 to maximize their respective expected profits.
Following the above discussion, we now write the expected profit function for retailer
i:
πiST = E[ri Ri + (rj − τij )Tij − ri Tji + si Li ] − wi Qi .

(1)

For a more general setting when the transshipment price does not equal the retail
price in Section 6.1, the above function should be replaced by
πiST = E[ri Ri + (cij − τij )Tij − cji Tji + si Li ] − wi Qi .
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4

Analysis

We use backward induction to analyze retailers’ transshipment and inventory decisions.

4.1

Transshipment Decisions

If after demand realization, both retailers have leftover inventory or both retailers encounter shortage, there will be no substitution or transshipment. So in this subsection,
we mainly discuss the situation in which retailer j encounters shortage and retailer i has
leftover inventory after demand realization. Different from Fu et al. (2020)’s analysis
of the transshipment quantity for the T S scenario in Stage 2, the Stage 2 transshipment quantity for the ST scenario is quite straightforward, which corresponds to the
smaller one of the demand from non-switching customers at retailer j and the available
inventory at retailer i:

TijST




(1 − φj )(Dj − Qj ),
if Qi − Di > Dj − Qj > 0


=
Qi − Di − φj (Dj − Qj ), if Dj − Qj > Qi − Di > φj (Dj − Qj ) > 0



 0,
otherwise.

For the T S scenario, we borrow the results of TijT S from Fu et al. (2020) here for
easy comparison later:

TijT S =

4.2




D − Qj ,

 j

if Qi − Di > Dj − Qj > 0




 0,

otherwise.

Qi −Di −φj (Dj −Qj )
,
1−φj

if Dj − Qj > Qi − Di > φj (Dj − Qj ) > 0

Inventory Competition

For simplicity, we follow the method of the previous research (Rudi et al. 2001, Fu
et al. 2020) and define a set of events and their associated probabilities, as shown in
Table 1 and illustrated graphically in Figure 1.
E 0 means that both retailers have excess inventory. This event corresponds to
probability υ(Qi , Qj ). E 4 means that both retailers have shortage and its probability
is represented by ς(Qi , Qj ). Ei1 means that retailer i has excess inventory and that
the excess inventory is larger than the shortage at retailer j. Ei2 and Ei3 correspond to
10

the Partial-Transshipment and No-Transshipment scenarios in Fu et al. (2020) for the
T S scenario. These events also can be applied to the ST scenario. Ei2 means retailer i
has excess inventory and that the excess inventory is less than the shortage at retailer
j but more than the quantity that is needed by the switching customers from retailer
j. Ei3 means retailer i has excess inventory and that excess inventory is less than the
quantity that is needed by the switching customers from retailer j. The probability
notations for the aforementioned events are γj (Qi , Qj ), i (Qi , Qj ) and θi (Qi , Qj ), which
are borrowed from Fu et al. (2020) and the transshipment literature, e.g., Rudi et al.
(2001) and Hu et al. (2007). The unmentioned events are for the opposite situation
where retailer j has leftover inventory and retailer i encounters shortage.
Event

Region

Description

Probability

E0

1

Di < Qi , Dj < Qj

υ(Qi , Qj )

Transshipment Decision “ST ”

Ei

1,2,3,4

Di < Qi

α(Qi )

Ei1

2

Qi − Di > Dj − Qj > 0

γj (Qi , Qj )

Partial: Tij = (1 − φj )(Dj − Qj )

Ei2

3

i (Qi , Qj )

Partial: Tij = Qi − Di − φj (Dj − Qj )

Ei3

4

θi (Qi , Qj )

No: Tij = 0

4

5

E

Ej

1,6,7,8

Ej3

6

Ej2

7

Ej1

8

0 < Qi − Di < Dj − Qj <
Dj − Qj >

Qi −Di
φj

Qi −Di
φj

>0

Di > Qi , Dj > Qj

ς(Qi , Qj )

Dj < Qj
Di − Qi >

Qj −Dj
φi

α(Qj )
>0

0 < Qj − Dj < Di − Qi <

Qj −Dj
φi

Qj − Dj > Di − Qi > 0

θj (Qi , Qj )

No: Tji = 0

j (Qi , Qj )

Partial: Tji = Qj − Dj − φi (Di − Qi )

γi (Qi , Qj )

Partial: Tji = (1 − φi )(Di − Qi )

Table 1: Events and Transshipment Decisions for ST Scenario
Substituting the transshipment decision TijST into (1), we can rewrite retailer i’s expected profit (1) as a function of the order quantities for two retailers, i.e., πiST (Qi , Qj ).
Thus, a Nash equilibrium for the ST scenario in Stage 1 is an order quantity vector
ST
(QST
i , Qj ) that satisfies

∂πiST (Qi , Qj )/∂Qi = 0,

(i, j) = (1, 2), (2, 1).

(2)

Solving the above problem, we have the following result:
ST
Proposition 1 There exists a unique Nash equilibrium (QST
i , Qj ) for the post-substitution

transshipment which is the unique solution to Equation (2) for (i, j) = (1, 2), (2, 1).

Notice that for the pre-substitution transshipment (T S), we also can prove in a
similar way that a unique Nash equilibrium (QTi S , QTj S ) exists when the transshipment
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Figure 1: Graphical Illustration of the Event Space Partition

price is set to the transshipment buyer’s retailing price. Our following analysis is based
on these two results.

4.3

Sensitivity Analysis

For sensitivity analysis, Fu et al. (2020) have done a comprehensive study for the T S
scenario. We now supplement the analysis for the ST scenario. It is worth mentioning
that our way to prove the change of Q with respect to a change in φ is different from
their method. We find a simple way to prove it and get a cleaner result for the ST
scenario. We only discuss the symmetric game here. The sensitivity analysis for the
asymmetric game will be shown in Section 6.2.
Proposition 2 Consider the symmetric case.
(a) The equilibrium order quantity QST increases in the selling price r, transshipment
price c, and salvage value s, but decreases in the acquisition cost w and transshipment
cost τ .
(b) The expected transshipment quantity E[T ST ] increases (decreases) in r and s, and
decreases (increases) in w and τ if (1 + φ)ST − (1 − φ)γ ST > 0 (< 0).
12

(c) The equilibrium order quantity QST increases in the switching probability φ.
For Proposition 2(a), it is easy to understand that the equilibrium order quantity
increases in the price parameters and decreases in the cost parameters.
We further examine the sensitivity of the expected transshipment quantity in
Proposition 2(b) and it helps us to understand the mutual effects of transshipment
and substitution to the competition in the subsequent sections. Proposition 2(b) implies that the expected transshipment quantity first increases as QST does, but when
QST is big enough, the stockout possibility begins to be low, and thus the demand
for transshipment becomes less. Then the expected transshipment quantity begins to
decrease. We can see that the formula (1 + φ)ST − (1 − φ)γ ST is the inventory understocked and overstocked boundary. When (1 + φ)ST − (1 − φ)γ ST > 0, the inventory
competition is less severe, the need for transshipment increases as r and s do. But
when r and s become large enough which makes (1 + φ)ST − (1 − φ)γ ST < 0, the need
for transshipment begins to decrease in r and s. The same is to the effects of w and
s on (1 + φ)ST − (1 − φ)γ ST and thus the expected transshipment quantity. We use
numerical experiments to illustrate this effect in Figure 2. Here we will only show the
effect of r, the behaviors induced by other parameters are the same to that by r.
For Proposition 2(c), it is easy to understand that more customers willing to switch
encourages retailers to stock more inventory, but too much inventory will reduce the
stockout possibility and thus reduce retailers’ incentives to overstock. However, this
result Proposition 2(c) implies that the second situation never happens. The switching
probability will only increase the inventory competition in the ST scenario. This
surprising result will greatly influence the expected profit of the ST scenario when φ
is large enough. We will discuss it later in Section 6.1.
Here it is worth mentioning that in the discussion of the equilibrium order quantity
to the switching probability for the T S scenario in Fu et al. (2020), the equilibrium
order quantity QT S increases in the switching probability φ (see their Corollary 1)
when the demands are uniformly distributed. But we find that it is not always the
case for other demand distributions. The special reaction of the expected transshipment quantity in the T S scenario to the switching probability under other demand
distributions together with our Proposition 2(c) will lead to the opposite performances
of the two transshipment timings. We will show it in detail in Section 6.1.
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Figure 2: Graphical Illustration of the Turning Point in the Change of r (w = 15,
c = r, τ = 3, s = 5, φ = 0.3 under U [0, 100])
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5

Comparison of Two Transshipment Timings

In this section, we analyze the impact of transshipment timing. Due to high complexity,
we will only study the symmetric game in this section. As usual, we start with the
analysis of the equilibrium order quantity.
Proposition 3 QST ≥ QT S .
This result illustrates that the order quantity of the ST scenario is always higher
than that of the T S scenario. The prior literature has shown that customer switching
leads to inventory overstock (Lippman and McCardle 1997 and Mahajan and Van
Ryzin 2001). However, transshipment may lead to inventory overstock or understock
depending on the problem parameters (Hu et al. 2007 and Fu et al. 2020). So in
overlapping markets, this result implies that the effect of customer switching on the
ST scenario outweighs its effects on the T S scenario. So that no matter the existence
of transshipment mitigates or intensifies the inventory competition, under the postsubstitution transshipment, symmetric retailers will order more inventory for future
sales than they do under the pre-substitution transshipment.
To understand the rationale behind, we analyze the tradeoffs of two retails under
two transshipment timings in Stage 2. Table 2 and Table 3 are the income structures of
two timing scenarios under three demand realization situations in Stage 2. Here we only
discuss situations where one side (retailer i) is overstocked and the other side (retailer
j) is understocked. There is no tradeoff in situations without reallocation in Stage 2.
Table 2 shows the preference of the overstocked side and Table 3 shows the preference
of the understocked side in Stage 2. For the overstocked side, in the first situation, the
total amount of inventory that will be reallocated in Stage 2 is Dj −Qj . The reallocated
inventory is divided into two parts: one part is for transshipment and the other part is
for substitution. The quantity in Table 2 marked in bold is the larger one between the
transshipment quantity and substitution quantity in the same row. Because we have
assumed rj −τij < ri , which means substitution will bring more revenue per unit to the
overstocked side. So retailer with leftover inventory will prefer the scenario that brings
more substitution quantity to it. So in the first two situations, the overstocked side will
prefer the ST scenario which brings more substitution quantity to it. The overstocked
side is indifferent between the two timing scenarios in the third situation. But overall,
the overstocked retailer prefers to implement the ST scenario. We apply the same
15
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rj − τij

Dj − Qj >

Qi −Di
φj

>0
0

Qi − Di
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rj −rj (cij )

rj −rj (cij )

Table 3: Tradeoff Analysis for the Understocked Side in Stage 2
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0

Qi − Di

TS

rj − τij

Choice for Understocked Side

>0

Qi − Di − φj (Dj − Qj )

Qi − Di

ST

Qi − Di > Dj − Qj > 0

Qi −Di
φj

Qi −Di −φj (Dj −Qj )
1−φj

Qi − Di
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0

0

0

0

0
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analysis to the understocked side in Table 3 and the result is just the opposite: the
understocked retailer prefers to implement the T S scenario. (Notice although the two
mechanisms both will not bring revenue to the understocked side, e.g., rj −rj (cij ) = 0.
It is just a boundary case. In the more general situations, when the transshipment price
cij is set lower than rj , The understocked side will definitely prefer the T S scenario.)
So under the ST scenario, retailers will try to become the overstocked side and stock
more inventory at the beginning of the selling season. On the contrary, under the T S
scenario, stocking less inventory to become the understocked side in Stage 2 turns to
be retailers’ priority. This tradeoff analysis perfectly explains why ST scenario always
incentivizes retailers to stock more inventory than T S scenario does.
Following the above result, now let us consider the preference of their supplier and
the welfare of their customers.
Proposition 4 The supplier always prefers the post-substitution transshipment.
The supplier always prefers the post-substitution transshipment because the retailers order more from the supplier.
Proposition 5 The fulfilling rate for customers under the post-substitution transshipment is always higher than that under the pre-substitution transshipment.
It is easy to understand that when retailers keep a higher level inventory, the
fulfilling rate for the customers must be higher, which increases the social welfare of
the customers.
Proposition 6 If (1 + φ)ST − (1 − φ)γ ST ≤ 0, E[T ST ] ≤ E[T T S ].
Observation 1 E[T ST ] ≤ E[T T S ].
Remark 1 Though we have imposed a sufficient condition for this comparison result,
our numerical results show that E[T ST ] ≤ E[T T S ] always holds for all instances we
have tested. In the analysis of Section 4.1, we know that there are three possible transshipment quantities under three demand realization circumstances. If the equilibrium
order quantity is the same for the two timing scenarios (QST = QT S ), the two scenarios will face the same demand realization situation. It is obvious that TijST ≤ TijT S
always holds under each of the three demand realization circumstances in Stage 2, so
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that E[T ST ] ≤ E[T T S ] holds if QST = QT S . However, QST > QT S always holds (except for some special cases where QST = QT S ), which means that retailers will stock
more inventory in the ST scenario. So the possibility for retailers to initiate transshipment becomes lower because the stock-out possibility becomes lower under the ST
scenario. Under the two factors mentioned above (lower expected transshipment quantity and a lower possibility to initiate transshipment). It is obvious that the expected
transshipment quantity is lower in the ST scenario.
This result implies that transshipment timing actually decides which mechanism (transshipment and substitution) plays a decisive role in solving the supply and
demand mismatch in Stage 2. In the T S scenario, transshipment happens before
customer switching. Transshipment becomes the main way to solve the supply and
demand mismatch and customer switching is only a supplement. So the expected
transshipment quantity is higher in the T S scenario. In the ST scenario, retailers
transship their leftover inventory after customer switching, which implies that a part
of the supply and demand mismatch has been solved by customer switching and that
transshipment plays the secondary role in this supply and demand unbalance. So the
expected transshipment quantity is lower in this timing scenario. Second, different
from in the ST scenario, where the overstocked inventory after customer switching can
be perfectly solved by transshipment, in the T S scenario, retailers need to decide their
transshipment quantity ex-ante before customers switching, which brings more uncertainties to them. So retailers will transship out more to lower their still-overstocked
risk in the second stage and make sure their salvage level low because salvage is less
profitable than transshipment. Notice that in the ST scenario, customer switching
happens before transshipment. So the quantity of the leftover demand that could be
satisfied by transshipment is lower because a full portion φ of the unsatisfied demand
has been solved by substitution. But in the T S scenario, only a portion φ of the
unsatisfied demand after transshipment will be solved by substitution. This analysis
corresponds to our previous inference that the mechanism implemented first plays the
main role in solving the supply and demand mismatch.
Proposition 7 When c = r and demands are independent, identical and uniformly
distributed (i.i.u.), π ST (QST , QST ) ≥ π T S (QT S , QT S ).
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We address the profit comparison results under uniform distribution here for a
couple of reasons. Firstly, the analysis of the profit is very complicated even for the
uniform distribution. But luckily, it is still treatable. Secondly, numerical experiments
with uniform distribution have been widely used to study transshipment and inventory
competition (see Netessine and Rudi 2003, Shao et al. 2011 and Fu et al. 2020). The
results here will help our explanation for the numerical results in Section 6.1. Lastly,
uniform distribution is actually the most uncertain distribution which provides very
little information about the future demand. The performance of the ST scenario
under uniform distribution actually implies that the overstocked quantity is not that
much and it could not influence the benefits brought by the ST scenario when the
transshipment price equals the retail price. So that retailers will still prefer the ST
scenario when the demand distribution is less uncertain as we have discovered later.
Proposition 8
(a) When c = r and τ = 0, QST = QT S , E[T ST ] < E[T T S ], and π ST (QST , QST ) =
π T S (QT S , QT S ).
(b) When φ = 0, QST = QT S , E[T ST ] = E[T T S ], and π ST (QST , QST ) = π T S (QT S , QT S ).
Remark 2 (a) When transshipment cost equals 0, it is indifferent for the overstocked
retailer to solve the overstock problem through transshipment or substitution. All of its
leftover inventory will be consumed according to the shortage of the market. Besides,
when transshipment price equals the retail price, under any timing scenarios, the extra
earnings from inventory reallocation will all go to the overstocked side. So the problems
under the two timing scenarios are reduced to the same less strategic newsvendor game
and thus the competitive results of the equilibrium order quantity and the expected profit
are also the same.
(b) Because when there is no switching customer, the only way for retailers to
solve the supply and demand mismatch in Stage 2 is transshipment. So retailers will
transship their excess inventory to the extent possible. The problems under the two
timing scenarios are reduced to the same one discussed in Rudi et al. (2001). Not
surprisingly, the main characteristics of the two scenarios are the same.
Observation 2 When c = r, π ST (QST , QST ) ≥ π T S (QT S , QT S ).
Remark 3 As we cannot analytically prove Observation 1, our numerical results show
that if transshipment price is set to the retail price, ST scenario always has better
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performance than T S scenario does for symmetric retailers. Intuitively, the expected
profit should be decreasing in the transshipment cost τ just as the equilibrium order
quantity does in Proposition 2(a). And the decreasing rate in the T S scenario should
be larger than that in the ST scenario ( ∂π

T S (QT S ,QT S )

∂τ

<

∂π ST (QST ,QST )
∂τ

< 0) because

transshipment is the main way to solve supply and demand mismatch in the T S scenario (E[T ST ] ≤ E[T T S ]). So that T S scenario should be more sensitive to the
change of the transshipment cost τ . Remembering from the Proposition 8(a), when
c = r and τ = 0, we always have π ST (QST , QST ) = π T S (QT S , QT S ). As τ increases, π T S (QT S , QT S ) will decrease faster than π ST (QST , QST ). So that we always have
π ST (QST , QST ) ≥ π T S (QT S , QT S ). The numerical experiments in Section 6.1 will
validate our logic here.
There are only a few papers in the literature comparing the profits of the two
mechanisms. The traditional idea is that higher transshipment price usually leads
to fiercer inventory competition and thus may not benefit retailers (Shao et al. 2011
and Fu et al. 2020). But our study implies that for symmetric retailers, when the
transshipment price is set to the retail price, though ST scenario always leads to more
intense inventory competition compared with the T S scenario, the payoff in the ST
scenario for symmetric retailers is always better. This is a new finding to the literature.
Now we illustrate the relationship of Proposition 3, Observation 1, and Observation
2. One basic logic is that when the market parameters are fixed, the expected profit
is mainly decided by the retailers’ original inventory levels in Stage 1 and their transshipment decisions in Stage 2. So the result of the Observation 2 could be explained
by Proposition 3, Observation 1, and the earlier sensitivity analysis. From Proposition
2(a), we know the equilibrium order quantity increases in the transshipment price c.
So when transshipment price c is set to the retail price r which is the upper bound of
the transshipment price in our model, the inventory competition between two retailers
reaches to the highest degree. From the previous literature, we know that too fierce
inventory competition is detrimental to both sides. So here the lower equilibrium order quantity of the T S scenario is an advantage because the inventory competition is
lessened. But since transshipment is the main way to solve the supply and demand
mismatch for the T S scenario, the higher expected transshipment quantity is a disadvantage because the leftover inventory sold by transshipment is less profitable than by
substitution (retailers need to afford the transshipment cost while the substitution cost
20

is afforded by customers). Since Observation 2 shows that ST scenario will bring to the
higher expected profit, we can infer that when transshipment price c is set to the retail
price r, the revenue advantage brought by the dampened competition (QT S ≤ QST )
of the T S scenario must could not offset its cost disadvantage (τ E[T T S ] > τ E[T ST ]
if τ 6= 0). Our numerical analysis in Section 6.1 will verify this conjecture and provide more insights into the impact of these two factors (revenue advantage and cost
disadvantage) for the T S scenario later.
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6

Extensions

In this section, we conduct extensive experiments to illustrate the effect of transshipment timing on the firms’ profits and to tackle the questions that are impossible to
be analytically studied. We start from the symmetric game and then proceed to the
asymmetric game to gain additional insights into this problem.

6.1

Numerical Analysis for Symmetric Game

In this subsection, we assume two retailers are symmetric in all of the problem parameters and release the constraints of the transshipment price c, which does not necessarily
equal the retail price r. Though we can not theoretically prove that the Nash equilibrium always exists when c < r, our numerical results all have one unique Nash
equilibrium. We will examine the change of the expected profits under the two timing
scenarios with respect to the change of the switching probability φ, transshipment price
c, and transshipment cost τ . Most of our findings are based on our extensive numerical
experiments under some common demand distributions (e.g., uniform, exponential, beta, and gamma distributions). For simplicity, we will only use the uniform distribution
U [0, 100] and exponential distribution with mean

1
3

to illustrate our findings.

Transshipment price c and switching probability φ are the key parameters of transshipment and substitution respectively and play decisive roles in the performance of
the two timing scenarios. To get a better understanding of their effects, we conduct
an experiment to study the interaction of these two parameters. Figure 3 shows the
interaction of the transshipment price c and switching probability φ to the performance
of the two timing scenarios. Under the combination of (c, φ) in the gray region, T S
scenario performs better. Under the combination of (c, φ) in the white region, ST
scenario contributes higher expected profit to symmetric retailers.
Observation 3
(a) When c is large, π ST (QST , QST ) > π T S (QT S , QT S ).
(b) When φ is small, π ST (QST , QST ) > π T S (QT S , QT S ).
(c) π T S (QT S , QT S ) > π ST (QST , QST ) if and only if when φ is large and c is small.
Remark 4 Here Observation 3(a) supports Observation 2 in Section 5. But meanwhile, it also implies that the threshold ~c for π ST (QST , QST ) ≥ π T S (QT S , QT S ) is less
22

Figure 3: Illustration of Retailers’ Preference for Transshipment Timing (r = 25,
w = 12, s = 5, τ = 3 under U [0, 100])
than the retail price r. For c ∈ [~c, r], the ST scenario always outperforms the T S
scenario for symmetric retailers.
Now we explain the details of this observation. From the analysis in Section 5,
we know that the advantage of T S scenario comes from its lower equilibrium order
quantity (Proposition 3). But its higher expected transshipment quantity (Observation
2) is costly and will lower the expected profit. Here we use these two factors (revenue
advantage and cost disadvantage) to explain the above observations. We pick four
lines (line 1 c = 20, line 2 c = 24, line 3 φ = 0.2, and line 4 φ = 0.8) in Figure 4 and
list the change of the corresponding equilibrium order quantity for each line in Figure
5 and Figure 6. We first have the following observation.
Observation 4 QST is more sensitive to the switching probability φ than QT S , while
QT S is more sensitive to the transshipment price c than QST . That is
dQT S
dφ

while

dQT S
dc

>

dQST
dc

dQST
dφ

>

.

From Figure 5, we can see that at c = 20 or c = 24, the equilibrium order quantity
of the ST scenario increases faster in φ than that of the T S scenario, which implies
dQST
dφ

>

dQT S
dφ .

In particular, QT S is nearly constant regardless of φ. Then a high φ has

a profound impact on the performance of the ST scenario while having a much lower
impact on the performance of the T S scenario. This corresponds to our discussion of
the Proposition 2(c). But in Figure 6, the sensitivity with respect to the transshipment
price c in the T S scenario is much higher, i.e.,
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dQT S
dc

>

dQST
dc

.

Figure 4: Areas of Better Performed Scenarios with Four Lines (r = 25, w = 12, s = 5,
τ = 3 under U [0, 100])

Figure 5: Change of Equilibrium Order Quantity to the Switching Probability at c = 20
and c = 24 (r = 25, w = 12, s = 5, τ = 3 under U [0, 100])
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Figure 6: Change of Equilibrium Order Quantity to the Transshipment Price at φ = 0.2
and φ = 0.8 (r = 25, w = 12, s = 5, τ = 3 under U [0, 100])
Let us go back to Observation 3. For Observation 3(a), as the T S scenario is much
more sensitive to the transshipment price c, when c is big enough to induce retailers in
the T S scenario to hold a high inventory level which is very close to QST (as shown in
Figure 6), the revenue advantage of the T S scenario is very small and cannot outweigh
its cost disadvantage. Consequently, ST scenario brings a higher expected profit to
symmetric retailers. For Observation 3(b), remember in Proposition 8(b), when φ = 0,
QST = QT S . When φ is close to 0, the two transshipment timings will have very close
equilibrium order quantities. Similarly, the ST scenario is preferred due to its much
lower transshipment cost. It is no longer true when φ is large enough and c is small
enough. In this situation, a large φ will lead to very intense inventory competition
in the ST scenario, but as long as the transshipment price c keeps low, the inventory
competition in the T S scenario is less intense. Now the revenue advantage of the T S
scenario comes into play and far outweighs its cost disadvantage. As a result, we have
Observation 3(c).
Remark 5 Observation 4 actually provides us with very important insights into understanding the effects of the switching probability φ and the transshipment cost c.
These two factors influence the performance of the two timing scenarios by influencing the mechanism that happens first. For example, for the switching probability φ,
its impact on the ST scenario is more profound than on the T S scenario because the
mechanism happens first in the T S scenario is transshipment which has no relation
with the switching probability. Remember in Section 5, we assert that transshipment is
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the main way to solve the supply and demand mismatch in Stage 2 for the T S scenario,
so is substitution for the ST scenario. Observation 4 provides the analytical proof for
this assertion.
Now we offer more discussion on the transshipment price c. There are two thresholds c̄ ≤ c̃ both belong to [ct , r] (ct is the lower bound for the viable transshipment price
in the T S scenario, see Fu et al. 2020) that when c ∈ [ct , c̄], the ST scenario performs
better; when c ∈ [c̄, c̃], the T S scenario performs better; and when c ∈ [c̃, r], the ST
scenario performs better again. But the three intervals may not always exist: when
ct = c̄, [ct , c̄] vanish just like under most situations as shown by the dash line boundary
in Figure 3 when φ > 0.3; when c̄ = c̃, [c̄, c̃] vanish when φ is close to 0. However, c̃
will never equals r, because when c = r, ST scenario always performs better.
Next, we study the impact of the transshipment cost τ . Remember in Proposition
8(a), we know that when c = r and τ = 0, the two transshipment timings bring the
same expect profit to retailers. And in Observation 2, when c = r and τ 6= 0, ST
scenario always outperforms T S scenario. Figure 7(a) provides numerical evidence
for it. We now examine when c < r, how the performances change as τ increases.
Figure 7(b) and Figure 7(c) show the change of expected profits to the change of τ
under different demand distributions. We can see that when c < r, π ST (QST , QST )
and π T S (QT S , QT S ) are both strictly decreasing in the transshipment cost τ . And the
decreasing rate in the T S scenario is higher than that in the ST scenario, consistent
with our discussion in Remark 3. Then we have the following result.
Observation 5 The expected profit functions of two timing scenarios intersect exactly
once at τ ∗ ∈ [0, τ̂ ] (τ̂ is the upper bound of τ ) as τ increases. When τ ∈
[0, τ ∗ ), π T S (QT S , QT S ) > π ST (QST , QST ); when τ ∈ (τ ∗ , τ̂ ], π ST (QST , QST ) >
π T S (QT S , QT S ); and when τ = τ ∗ , π T S (QT S , QT S ) = π ST (QST , QST ).
Observation 5 implies that there exists a threshold τ ∗ that decides which of the
timing scenarios performs better under different τ . Here we still use the previous two
factors to explain this finding. When τ is rather small, the inventory competition is
rather fierce, so the T S scenario which leads to lower inventory stock performs better.
But as τ increases, the disadvantage brought by the increase of the transshipment cost
finally exceeds the advantage of the lower equilibrium order quantity. So that when τ
passes τ ∗ , the ST scenario begins to be preferred.
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(a) r = 25, w = 15.5, s = 5, c = 25, φ = 0.3 under
U (0, 100)

(b) r = 25, w = 15.5, s = 5, c = 20, φ = 0.3 under
U (0, 100)

(c) r = 25, w = 15.5, s = 5, c = 20, φ = 0.3 under
Exponential ( 31 )

Figure 7: The Effect of Transshipment Cost
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6.2

Analysis for Asymmetric Game

In this subsection, we analyze the preferences of asymmetric retailers. In reality, it is
common that the wholesale prices are different for different retailers. For instance, one
retailer may have greater bargaining power than the other to negotiate the wholesale
price with their suppliers. We offer some discussions based on asymmetric wholesale
prices. Specifically, we assume that retailer i has a lower wholesale price, that is
wi < wj . Notice that in overlapping market, the two retailers are geographically
close to each other, the differentiation of other market parameters between these two
retailers should be very small.
We first compare the impact of the symmetry change on the change of the equilibrium order quantity. We use parameters with subscripts “i” and “j” to represent
the asymmetric case and use parameters without subscript to represent the symmetric
case.
Proposition 9 When τij = τji = 0, the demands are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.), if wi < wj = w or wi = w < wj , then Q∗i > Q∗ > Q∗j for both ST
and T S scenarios.
Remark 6 From this result, we know that no matter in which timing scenario, the
wholesale price disadvantage of retailer j dampens its competitiveness with retailer i
(e.g., Q∗i > Q∗j ). This asymmetry even enhances the advantage of retailer i because
Q∗i > Q∗ implies that in asymmetric case, to stock more inventory is profitable for
retailer i than in symmetric case; and aggravate the disadvantage of retailer j because
Q∗j < Q∗ implies that retailer j lose its confidence in its market size compared with in
symmetric case. Notice here the condition τij = τji = 0 enables us to get this analytical
result. The result of Proposition 9 still holds when τij 6= 0 and τji 6= 0 in our numerical
results.
Next, we conduct some numerical experiments to study the effects of the transshipment timing.
First, notice that we can infer from Proposition 9 that the equilibrium order quantity of one retailer increases in its competitor’s cost parameter (wholesale price) and
decreases in its own cost parameter (wholesale price). Figure 8 shows this result.
Figure 8 shows the change of the equilibrium order quantities of two asymmetric
retailers (retailer i and retailer j) and of two symmetric retailers in the change of
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(a) Change of Different Retailers’ Equilibrium Order Quantities with wj (w) in the ST
Scenario

(b) Change of Different Retailers’ Equilibrium Order Quantities with wj (w) in the T S
Scenario

Figure 8: Comparison of Equilibrium Order Quantities when wi < w = wj (ri = rj =
25, wi = 10, wj = 15, cij = rj , cji = ri , si = sj = 5, φi = φj = 0.3 under U [0, 100])
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wj (w). Here we clearly have the relationship Q∗i > Q∗ > Q∗j as Proposition 9 has
demonstrated though now τij = τji = 3 rather than 0. From them, we can see that
Q∗i increases in wj but Q∗j decreases in wj . As we have discussed in Proposition 2, Q∗
decreases in w. Although Q∗ and Q∗j all decrease in wj (w), the decreasing rate of Q∗j
is higher than that of Q∗ and the lower order quantity also slightly lowers the expected
profit of retailer j as shown in Figure 9. This result again implies that asymmetry
indeed puts retailer j at a disadvantage.

(a) Change of Different Retailers’ Expected Profits with wj (w) in the ST Scenario

(b) Change of Different Retailers’ Expected Profits with wj (w) in the T S Scenario

Figure 9: Expected Profit Compare among Asymmetric Retailers and Symmetric Retailers when wi < w = wj (ri = rj = 25, wi = 10, wj = 15, cij = rj , cji = ri ,
si = sj = 5, φi = φj = 0.3 under U [0, 100])
From the above discussion, we know that asymmetry leads to the retailer with
cost advantage (retailer i) inevitably extracting more profits from the retailer with
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cost disadvantage (retailer j). Then retailer j prefers the scenario that brings higher
expected profit to it. Remember in the symmetric case, when the transshipment price
equals the retail price, ST scenario is always preferable for retailers. Next, we check
the robustness of this result to see if asymmetry will alter this finding. We will show
the impact of the two timing scenarios on the asymmetric retailers’ equilibrium order
quantities and their expected profits to see if two retailers will still prefer the same
scenario at the same time.
We examine the change of the equilibrium order quantities and the expected profits
to the change of transshipment price τ = τij = τji , and the results are shown in Figure
10. The impact of other parameters is quite similar to the transshipment price τ in
our numerical experiments and here for simplicity and clearness, we omit them. We
have the following observation.
T S and π ST (QST , QST ), π T S (QT S , QT S )
Observation 6 When wi < wj , both QST
i , Qi
i
i
j
i
i
j

are decreasing in τ and retailer i will always prefer the ST scenario. But both
T S and π ST (QST , QST ), π T S (QT S , QT S ) are concave in τ . There is a
QST
j , Qj
j
j
i
j
j
i

threshold τ Ay that when τ < τ Ay , retailer j prefers the T S scenario; when
τ > τ Ay , retailer j prefers the ST scenario; and when τ = τ Ay , retailer j is
indifferent to the two timing scenarios.
Remark 7 Remembering we have assumed τ ∈ [0, τ̂ ], but here it is possible that τ Ay <
0 or τ Ay > τ̂ . Specifically, we find three possible situations. (a) τ Ay < 0 (e.g., as
shown in Figure 11). In this situation, QTj S and πjT S (QTj S , QTi S ) are decreasing in
ST
τ ∈ [0, τ̂ ] while QST
and πjST (QST
j
j , Qi ) are quasi-concave in τ ∈ [0, τ̂ ]. ST scenario

is preferable for both asymmetric retailers. This may happen when the asymmetry is
rather small (in Figure 11, wj − wi = 2). (b) 0 < τ Ay < τ̂ . This situation corresponds
to the situation dictated in Observation 6. This may happen when the asymmetry
grows larger than that in Case (a) (in Figure 10, wj − wi = 5). (c) τ Ay > τ̂ (e.g.,
ST
as shown in Figure 12). In this situation, QST
and πjST (QST
j
j , Qi ) are increasing in

τ ∈ [0, τ̂ ] while QTj S and πjT S (QTj S , QTi S ) are quasi-concave in τ ∈ [0, τ̂ ]. Retailer i
prefers the ST scenario while retailer j prefers the T S scenario. This may happen
when the asymmetry is rather bigger than that in Case (b) (in Figure 12, wj − wi = 8).
Generally speaking, τ Ay is increasing in the cost asymmetry of two retailers.
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32
(d) Change of Expected Profits of Retailer j

(b) Change of Equilibrium Order Quantities of Retailer j

under U [0, 100])

Figure 10: Effects of Transshipment Cost in Asymmetric Case (ri = rj = 25, wi = 10, wj = 15, cij = rj , cji = ri , si = sj = 5, φi = φj = 0.3

(c) Change of Expected Profits of Retailer i

(a) Change of Equilibrium Order Quantities of Retailer i
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(d) Change of Expected Profits of Retailer j

(b) Change of Equilibrium Order Quantities of Retailer j

wj = 12, cij = rj , cji = ri , si = sj = 5, φi = φj = 0.3 under U [0, 100])

Figure 11: Change of Q∗ and π ∗ of the Two Asymmetric Retailers to the Change of τ = τij = τji when wi < wj (ri = rj = 25, wi = 10,

(c) Change of Expected Profits of Retailer i

(a) Change of Equilibrium Order Quantities of Retailer i
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(d) Change of Expected Profits of Retailer j

(b) Change of Equilibrium Order Quantities of Retailer j

wj = 18, cij = rj , cji = ri , si = sj = 5, φi = φj = 0.3 under U [0, 100])

Figure 12: Change of Q∗ and π ∗ of the Two Asymmetric Retailers to the Change of τ = τij = τji when wi < wj (ri = rj = 25, wi = 10,

(c) Change of Expected Profits of Retailer i

(a) Change of Equilibrium Order Quantities of Retailer i

We can see that the ST scenario is still preferable for retailers with cost advantage
(retailer i) when the transshipment price equals the buyer’s retail price. This implies
that in the asymmetric case, when cij = rj , cji = ri and retailer i has an additional
cost advantage, this cost advantage does not influence the performance relationship
of the two timing scenarios for retailer i. But when it comes to the disadvantageous
side (retailer j), the cost disadvantage breaks the previous performance findings in the
symmetric game and complicates the problem.

6.3

Endogenous Transshipment Price and Timing Sequence

Fu et al. (2020) also analyze the endogenous transshipment price and discussed retailers’ best strategy under ex-ante and ex-post transshipment prices in the symmetric
case. In their ex-ante transshipment price discussions, they find that symmetric retailers will set transshipment price to the coordinating transshipment price of the system
if possible to maximize their profits. In their ex-post transshipment price discussions,
they find that cij = rj , cji = ri is the equilibrium transshipment price.
For simplicity, we will also only discuss the endogenous transshipment price in the
symmetric case. In our model, it can be shown that the central planner always prefers
the ST scenario. So that if the transshipment price is set ex-ante, it will be set to the
coordinating transshipment price of the ST scenario and thus will induce symmetric
retailers to implement the post-substitution transshipment. If the transshipment price
is set ex-post as cij = rj , cji = ri , which is the equilibrium transshipment price, our
Observation 2 has argued that ST scenario will bring the higher expected profit to
symmetric retailers.
Since if the transshipment price is endogenous, retailers always prefer the ST scenario, how about the timing sequence is endogenously decided? If the sequence is
set ex-ante, our previous discussions of which transshipment timing performs better
in different situations reveal retailers’ best choice. If the sequence is set ex-post by
retailers after the demand realization, we can infer that ST scenario is always preferable. Because for retailers holding excess inventory, he will always try to satisfy the
switching customers to the extent possible first and then transship out to meet the
demand of the rest loyal customers of the stockout retailer.
In conclusion, no matter whether the transshipment price is endogenous or the
timing sequence is decided ex-post, ST scenario is always preferable for symmetric
35

retailers.
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7

Conclusions

In overlapping market, two demand reallocation mechanisms have been identified:
transshipment and substitution. Retailers have choices to implement transshipment
before customer switching or afterward. Though these two transshipment timings
both can perfectly solve the supply and demand mismatch problem, their effects on
the inventory competition of two retailers and firms’ profits differ significantly. In
this paper, we mainly study how the two transshipment timings influence the profit
performances of two retailers.
We have the following main findings: Firstly, when transshipment price is set to the
transshipment buyer’s retail price, there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium. ST scenario
always leads to more intense inventory competition, while the T S scenario always
dampens the inventory competition. Secondly, we examine the expected profits of
symmetric retailers under the two timing scenarios. We find that when transshipment
price is set to the retail price, the ST scenario always outperforms the T S scenario for
symmetric retailers. Meanwhile, we also find that the ST scenario benefits the supplier
and the customers.
When the transshipment price is lower than the retail price, we also have a couple of findings. As parameters representing the two mechanisms, the transshipment
price and the switching probability play an important role. We find that if a large
proportion of the customers are willing to switch and the transshipment price is low,
the dampened competition in the T S scenario contributes to its better performance.
But if there is a small number of switching customers, or if transshipment price is high
enough, the two scenarios will have very close inventory stock levels. The benefits of
dampened competition in the T S scenario can not offset its higher transshipment cost,
so ST scenario is preferable for retailers. We also find that there is a threshold of the
transshipment cost that when the real transshipment cost is lower than the threshold,
T S scenario outperforms ST scenario and vice versa.
For asymmetric case, we first find that asymmetry leads the retailer with advantage
to stock more inventory but will dampen the overstock incentive of the disadvantageous
retailer. We further show that the equilibrium order quantity of one retailer increases
in the increase of its competitor’s cost parameter and decreases in the increase of its
own cost parameter. We find that two asymmetric retailers may not prefer the same
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scenario under the same market parameters though transshipment prices are still set
to the buyers’ retail prices.
There are several further research directions. First, one can introduce a supplier
into the competition to see which scenarios different stakeholders would prefer. It is
worth mentioning that if the wholesale price is exogenous, supplier (if any) in our
model prefers to implement the ST scenario, because it brings more orders to the
supplier. But when supplier could strategically set the wholesale price, it is not clear
which scenario is preferred. Second, in our study, we have some interesting numerical
results in the asymmetric case. One can conduct an analytical study of the asymmetric
parameters. Third, information asymmetry is also worth considering. In our model,
we assume that all of the market parameters are common knowledge for two retailers.
It is not clear which timing scenario different retailers would prefer when some of the
information is private.
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A

Appendix of Proofs

Firstly, we will illustrate some of the notations that we use in the following proofs.
When we compute the order quantity and the expected profit, we need to calculate
the probability of each event in Table 1. For simplicity, we use the notations in the
Probability column to represent the Calculus Form of each event.
Event

Region

Description

Probability

E0

1

Di < Q i , D j < Q j

υ(Qi , Qj )

Ei1

2

Qi − Di > Dj − Qj > 0

γj (Qi , Qj )

Ei2

3

0 < Q i − Di < D j − Qj <
Qi −Di
φj

Ei3

4

Dj − Qj >

E4

5

Di > Q i , D j > Q j

Ej3

6

Di − Qi >

Qj −Dj
φi

Ej2

7

0 < Q j − Dj < D i − Qi <

Ej1

8

Qi −Di
φj

>0

>0
Qj −Dj
φi

Qj − Dj > Di − Qi > 0

i (Qi , Qj )

Calculus Form
R Qi R Qj
f (xi , xj )dxj dxi
0
0
R Qi R Qj +Qi −xi
f (xi , xj )dxj dxi
Q
0
j

R Qi R Qj +
0

Qi −xi
φj

Qj +Qi −xi

θi (Qi , Qj )

R Qi R ∞

ς(Qi , Qj )

R∞R∞

θj (Qi , Qj )

R Qj R ∞

j (Qi , Qj )

R Qj R

γi (Qi , Qj )

R Qj R Qi +Qj −xj

0
Qi

Qj +
Qj

0

0
0

Qi −xi
φj

f (xi , xj )dxj dxi

f (xi , xj )dxj dxi

Qj −xj
φi
Q −x
Qi + jφ j
i
Qi +Qj −xj

Qi +

Qi

f (xi , xj )dxj dxi

f (xi , xj )dxi dxj
f (xi , xj )dxi dxj
f (xi , xj )dxi dxj

Table A.1: Events and Probability
We explain other notations here: for example, (Di + Dj ) γj means E((Di + Dj ) γj ) =
R Qi R Qj +Qi −xi
(xi + xj )f (xi , xj )dxj dxi (xi represents Di , xj represents Dj ). This forQj
0
mular represents the expected market demand of two retailers under Event 2. Using
(Di + Dj ) γj could be much clearer for comparison. γ ST means that we use equilibrium order quantity QST to replace Qi and Qj in the Calculus Form for symmetric
retailers. Because in symmetric case, two retailers will end up to the same equilibrium
order quantity.
Proof of Proposition 1.

∂πiST (Qi , Qj )
= ri − wi − (ri − si )αi (Qi ) + (rj − τij − si )βi (Qi , Qj )
∂Qi
+ φi (ri − ri )j (Qi , Qj ) − (1 − φi )(ri − ri )γi (Qi , Qj )
+ (ri + τij − rj )θi (Qi , Qj )
= ri − wi − (ri − si )αi (Qi ) + (rj − τij − si )βi (Qi , Qj )
+ (ri + τij − rj )θi (Qi , Qj )
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Following the symbols from Fu et al. (2020), we have
∂ 2 πiST (Qi , Qj )
ST
= −(ri − si )fD
(Qi ) + (rj − τij − si )(b2ij − b1ij )
i
∂Q2i
h1ij
+ (ri + τij − rj )(b2ij −
)
φj
ri + τij − rj 1
2
= −(ri − si )gij
− (rj − τij − si )b1ij −
hij
φj
and
∂ 2 πiST (Qi , Qj )
1
= −(rj − τij − si )b1ij + φi (ri − ri )(b2ij − gij
) − (ri + τij − rj )h1ij
∂Qi ∂Qj
1
= −(rj − τij − si )b1ij − (ri + τij − rj )h1ij − (ri − ri )(gij
− h1ji )

So
−(rj − τij − si )b1ij − (ri + τij − rj )h1ij
∂ 2 πiST (Qi , Qj )/∂Qi ∂Qj
dQi
=
−
=−
2 − (r − τ − s )b1 − ri +τij −rj h1
dQj
∂ 2 πiST (Qi , Qj )/∂Q2i
−(ri − si )gij
j
ij
i ij
ij
φj
∈ (−1, 0)
2 > 0, (r − τ − s )b1 > 0, and (r + τ − r )h1 > 0, as we have
because (ri − si )gij
j
ij
i ij
i
ij
j ij

assumed earlier to make the model feasible. Then there is one unique Nash Equilibrium for the ST scenario.



Proof of Proposition 2.
Here we only provide the proof for the change of QST in the switching probability
φ. The proof of other results is similar to Fu et al. (2020).
Following the proof of Fu et al. (2020), we take derivative on both side of Equation
(2) with respect to φ, we have
∂ 2 πiST
∂ 2 πiST dQST
∂ 2 πiST
]
+
= 0,
+
∂Qi ∂Qj dφ
∂Qi ∂φ
∂Q2i

[

From the proof of Proposition (1), we know
and

∂ 2 πiST
∂Qi ∂φ

= −τ

dST
dφ

which holds because
So we always have

∂ 2 πiST
∂Q2i

+

∂ 2 πiST
∂Qi ∂Qj

< 0,

> 0,
dST
dφ

dQST
dφ

= − φ12

RQ
0

(Q − xi )f (xi, Q +

Q−xi
φ )dxj dxi

< 0.

> 0, which means that the equilibrium order quantity QST

increases in the switching probability φ.



Proof of Proposition 3.

40

∂π ST (QST , QST )
= r − w − τ ST + (s − r)γ ST + (s − r)υ ST
∂Qi
τ
∂π T S (QT S , QT S )
=r−w−
T S + (s − r)γ T S + (s − r)υ T S
∂Qi
1−φ
Because QST and QT S are the equilibrium quantity, we have
∂π ST (QST ,QST )
∂Qi

∂π T S (QT S ,QT S )
∂Qi

= 0,

= 0. So

∂π T S (QST , QST )
= r − w − τ ST + (s − r)γ ST + (s − r)υ ST −
∂Qi
τ ST
(r − w −
+ (s − r)γ ST + (s − r)υ ST )
1−φ
φτ ST
=−
<0
1−φ
Because

∂π T S (QT S ,QT S )
∂Qi

is decreasing in QT S as

∂ 2 π T S (QT S ,QT S )
∂Q2i

< 0, so QST ≥ QT S

always holds.



Proof of Proposition 4.
Because π M (Q) = wQ which increases with Q.



Proof of Proposition 5.
Let W (Q) denote the fullfil rate.
So W (Q) =
∂W (Q)
∂Q

4Q(+θ)+2Qς+2(Di +Dj )γ+(Di +Dj )υ
EDi +EDj

= 4( + θ) + 2ς > 0 always hold.

So W (Q) increases with respect to Q, since QST > QT S ,
We always have W ST (QST ) > W T S (QT S ).



Proof of Proposition 6.

E[T ST ] = QST − Di − φ Dj − QST
E[T T S ] =
∂E[T ST ]
∂QST




ST + (1 − φ) Dj − QST γ ST ,


QT S − Di − φ(Dj − QT S ) T S
 + Dj − QT S γ T S .
1−φ

= (1 + φ)ST − (1 − φ)γ ST , so if (1 + φ) − (1 − φ)γ ≤ 0, E[T ST ] is decreasing

with respect to QST ,
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so that
E[T ST ] = QST − Di − φ Dj − QST
≤ QT S
≤


ST + (1 − φ) Dj − QST γ ST


− Di − φ Dj − QT S T S + (1 − φ) Dj − QT S γ T S



QT S − Di − φ(Dj − QT S ) T S
 + Dj − QT S γ T S = E[T T S ]
1−φ

The first inequality is because QST > QT S , and the second inequality is because
0 ≤ φ ≤ 1.



Proof of Proposition 7.
When c = r, and the demand density function is Uniform [0, u],
From, we know that there are three demand realization situations for each of the two
timing scenarios if the demand density function is Uniform. For the demand realization
situations of the ST and T S scenarios together, there are 5 possible demand realization
situations.
(1) 0 < QST ≤

Solve

φu
1+φ ,

0 < QT S ≤

φu
1+φ

:

∂πiST (Qi , Qj )
(QST )2 (3φ(s − r) + τ (φ − 1)) + 2u2 φ(r − w)
=
∂Qi
2u2 φ

(A.1)

∂πiT S (Qi , Qj )
2u2 φ(r − w) − (QT S )2 (3φ(r − s) + τ )
=
∂Qi
2u2 φ

(A.2)

∂πiST (Qi ,Qj )
∂Qi

= 0 (QST > 0) and

∂πiT S (Qi ,Qj )
∂Qi

√
ST

Q

= 0 (QT S > 0), we can get

p
2u φ(r − w)

=p
3φ(r − s) + τ (1 − φ)
√ p
2u φ(r − w)
TS
Q =p
3φ(r − s) + τ

When c = r, and the demand density function is Uniform [0, u],
π ST (QST , QST ) =
π T S (QT S , QT S ) =

QST ((QST )2 (4φ(s−r)−τ (1−φ))+6u2 φ(r−w))
6u2 φ
QT S ((QT S )2 (4φ(s−r)−τ )+6u2 φ(r−w))
6u2 φ

π ST (QST , QST ) − π T S (QT S , QT S )
QST ((QST )2 (4φ(s − r) − (1 − φ)τ ) + 6u2 φ(r − w))
6u2 φ
QT S ((QT S )2 (4φ(s − r) − τ ) + 6u2 φ(r − w))
−
6u2 φ
=
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(A.3)

(A.4)

Taking Equation (A.3) and (A.4) into π ST (QST , QST ) − π T S (QT S , QT S ), we get
π ST (QST , QST ) − π T S (QT S , QT S )
p
5φ(r − s) + 2τ
5φ(r − s) + 2(1 − φ)τ
1√
−
)
2(r − w) u2 φ(r − w)(
=
3/2
3
(3φ(r − s) + (1 − φ)τ )
(3φ(r − s) + τ )3/2
p
√
− 2(r − w) u2 φ(r − w)
=
∗
3(3φ(r − s) + (1 − φ)τ )3/2 (3φ(r − s) + τ )3/2
p
( 3φ(r − s) + (1 − φ)τ (2(1 − φ)τ 2 + 15φ2 (r − s)2 + (11 − 5φ)φτ (r − s))
p
− ( 3φ(r − s) + τ (2(1 − φ)τ 2 + 15φ2 (r − s)2 + (11 − 6φ)φτ (r − s)))
To show π ST (QST , QST ) − π T S (QT S , QT S ) > 0 always holds, because
√
√
− 2(r−w) u2 φ(r−w)
< 0, we need to show
3(3φ(r−s)+(1−φ)τ )3/2 (3φ(r−s)+τ )3/2
p
3φ(r − s) + (1 − φ)τ (2(1 − φ)τ 2 + 15φ2 (r − s)2 + (11 − 5φ)φτ (r − s))
p
− ( 3φ(r − s) + τ (2(1 − φ)τ 2 + 15φ2 (r − s)2 + (11 − 6φ)φτ (r − s)))

(

is less than 0.
p
p
First, we know 2(1 − φ)τ 2 ( 3φ(r − s) + (1 − φ)τ − 3φ(r − s) + τ ) must be less
than 0.
p
Let h1 = 3φ(r − s) + (1 − φ)τ (15φ2 (r − s)2 + (11 − 5φ)φτ (r − s) > 0,
p
h2 = 3φ(r − s) + τ (15φ2 (r − s)2 + (11 − 6φ)φτ (r − s)) > 0.
Next, we need to prove that h1 − h2 < 0. Because
h21 −h22 = −φ3 τ (r−s)2 117(2 − φ)φτ (r − s) + 135φ2 (r − s)2 + τ 2 25φ2 + 99 − 99φ



is always less than 0,
So h1 − h2 < 0, then π ST (QST , QST ) − π T S (QT S , QT S ) > 0 must always be true.
We can prove the correctness of π ST (QST , QST ) − π T S (QT S , QT S ) > 0 followφu
ST
1+φ < Q
φu
u
TS
2 , 1+φ < Q

ing the same method for other demand realization situations: (2)
0 < QT S ≤

φu
1+φ ;

(3)

φu
1+φ

< QST ≤ u2 ,

φu
1+φ

< QT S ≤ u2 ; (4) QST >

(5) QST > u2 , QT S > u2 .

≤

u
2,

≤ u2 ;


Proof of Proposition 8.
(a) In symmetric case,
∂πiST (Qi , Qj )
= r − w − τ ST + (s − r)γ ST + (s − r)ν ST
∂Qi
∂πiT S (Qi , Qj )
τ
=r−w−
T S + (s − r)γ T S + (s − r)ν T S
∂Qi
1−φ
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When τ = 0,
∂πiST (Qi , Qj )
= r − w + (s − r)γ ST + (s − r)ν ST
∂Qi
∂πiT S (Qi , Qj )
= r − w + (s − r)γ T S + (s − r)ν T S
∂Qi
Solve

∂πiST (Qi ,Qj )
∂Qi

= 0 and

∂πiT S (Qi ,Qj )
∂Qi

= 0, we have QST = QT S . Notice that

E[T ST ] = QST − Di − φ Dj − QST
E[T T S ] =




ST + (1 − φ) Dj − QST γ ST ,


QT S − Di − φ(Dj − QT S ) T S
 + Dj − QT S γ T S ,
1−φ

So we have E[T ST ] < E[T T S ]. Since
π ST (QST , QST ) = (r − w)QST + (s − r)
−τ

QST




2QST − Di − Dj γ ST + QST − Di ν ST



− Di − φ Dj − QST ST + (1 − φ) Dj − QST γ ST

π T S (QT S , QT S ) = (r − w)QT S + (s − r)
− τ(




2QT S − Di − Dj γ T S + QT S − Di ν T S


QT S − Di − φ(Dj − QT S ) T S
 + Dj − QT S γ T S )
1−φ

If τ = 0,
π ST (QST , QST ) = (r − w)QST + (s − r)




2QST − Di − Dj γ ST + QST − Di ν ST

π T S (QT S , QT S ) = (r − w)QT S + (s − r)




2QT S − Di − Dj γ T S + QT S − Di ν T S

Because when τ = 0, we have QST = QT S , so π ST (QST , QST ) = π T S (QT S , QT S ).
(b) when φ = 0,
∂πiST (Qi , Qj )
= r − w − τ ST + (s − r)γ ST + (s − r)ν ST
∂Qi
∂πiT S (Qi , Qj )
= r − w − τ T S + (s − r)γ T S + (s − r)ν T S
∂Qi
Solve

∂πiST (Qi ,Qj )
∂Qi

= 0 and

∂πiT S (Qi ,Qj )
∂Qi

= 0, we have QST = QT S ,

When φ = 0,


E[T ST ] = QST − Di ST + Dj − QST γ ST ,


E[T T S ] = QT S − Di T S + Dj − QT S γ T S
So we have E[T ST ] = E[T T S ].
Because
π ST (QST , QST ) = (r − w)QST + (s − r)
−τ

QST




2QST − Di − Dj γ ST + QST − Di ν ST



− Di − φ Dj − QST ST + (1 − φ) Dj − QST γ ST
44

π T S (QT S , QT S ) = (r − w)QT S + (s − r)
− τ(




2QT S − Di − Dj γ T S + QT S − Di ν T S


QT S − Di − φ(Dj − QT S ) T S
 + Dj − QT S γ T S )
1−φ

When φ = 0,
π ST (QST , QST ) = (r − w)QST − τ
+ (s − r)

2QST




QST − Di ST + Dj − QST γ ST



− Di − Dj γ ST + QST − Di ν ST


π T S (QT S , QT S ) = (r − w)QT S − τ ((QT S − Di )T S + Dj − QT S γ T S )



+ (s − r) 2QT S − Di − Dj γ T S + QT S − Di ν T S
Because when φ = 0, we have QST = QT S , so π ST (QST , QST ) = π T S (QT S , QT S ).



Proof of Proposition 9.
For asymmetric retailer i and retailer j with wi < wj , when τij = τji = 0, cij = rj ,
cji = ri , and other parameters remain the same for retailer i and retailer j.
The first order derivatives of the two timing scenarios reduce to the same formula,
so here we drop the superscript ST and T S for easier read.
∂πi (Qi ,Qj )
∂Qi
∂πj (Qi ,Qj )
∂Qj

Solving

= r − wi + (s − r)γj + (s − r)v,
= r − wj + (s − r)γi + (s − r)v.





∂πi (Qi ,Qj )
∂Qi
∂πj (Qi ,Qj )
∂Qj

Z
r − wi = (r − s)(

Qi

=0

is equal to solving

=0
Qj +Qi −xi

Z

Qi

Z

Qj

Z

f (xi , xj )dxj dxi ) (A.5)

f (xi , xj )dxj dxi +

0

0

0

Qj

together with
Z
r − wj = (r − s)(

Qj

Z

Qi +Qj −xj

Qi

Z

Z

Qi

0

Qj

f (xi , xj )dxj dxi ) (A.6)

f (xi , xj )dxi dxj +
0

0

Since wi < wj , we have r − wi > r − wj > 0, to ensure the left hand inequality, we
must have the inequality of the right hand
Z

Qi

Z

Qj +Qi −xi

Z

Qi

Z

Qj

f (xi , xj )dxj dxi +
0

Z

Qj
Qj Z Qi +Qj −xj

>

f (xi , xj )dxj dxi
0

Z

0
Qi

Z

f (xi , xj )dxi dxj +
0

Qi

f (xi , xj )dxj dxi
0
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Qj

0

that is
Z

Qi

Qj +Qi −xi

Z

Qj

Z

Qi +Qj −xj

Z

f (xi , xj )dxj dxi >
0

f (xi , xj )dxi dxj

0

0

0

If the demands are independent and identically distributed,
We must have
Z Qi Z Qj +Qi −xi

Qj

Z

Qi +Qj −xj

Z

f (xi )f (xj )dxi dxj

f (xi )f (xj )dxj dxi >
0

0

0

0
Qj

Z

Qi +Qj −xi

Z

=

f (xi )f (xj )dxj dxi
0

0

To ensure the above inequality, we must have Qi > Qj , that is Q∗i > Q∗j .
For symmetric retailers, their first order derivative is
∂πi (Q,Q)
= r − w + (s − r)γ
∂Qi
(Q,Q)
Set ∂πi∂Q
to 0, we have
i

+ (s − r)v.

Q Z Q+Q−xi

Z
r − w = (r − s)(

QZ Q

Z
f (xi , xj )dxj dxi +

0

Q

f (xi , xj )dxj dxi )
0

(A.7)

0

If w = wj , when we compare Equation A.6 and Equation A.7,
the left hand of them are same, so we must have the equality of the right hand of
them:
Z

Qj

Z

Qi +Qj −xj

Qi

Z

Z

Qj

f (xi , xj )dxj dxi

f (xi , xj )dxi dxj +
0

Qi
Q Z Q+Q−xj

0

Z

Z

0
QZ Q

f (xi , xj )dxi dxj +

=
0

Q

f (xi , xj )dxj dxi
0

0

that is
Z

Qj

Z

Qj +Qi −xj

Z

Q Z Q+Q−xj

f (xi , xj )dxi dxj

f (xi , xj )dxi dxj =
0

0

0

(A.8)

0

Because
R Q R Q +Q −x
Z Qi
∂( 0 j 0 j i j f (xi , xj )dxi dxj )
=
f (xi , Qj + Qi − xi )dxi > 0
∂Qi
0
and
R Q R Q +Q −x
Z Qi
Z Qj
∂( 0 j 0 j i j f (xi , xj )dxi dxj )
=
f (xi , Qj )dxi +
f (Qj +Qi −xj , xj )dxj > 0
∂Qj
0
0
To ensure the equality of A.8, Qi and Qj could not be both > Q.
So together with the result Qi > Qj , we must Qi > Q > Qj , that is Q∗i > Q∗ > Q∗j .
The proof for w = wi < wj is the same to the above process.
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